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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(d), whereby the defendant in a circuit court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order on 
a misdemeanor offense. In this case, the Honorable Michael K. 
Burton, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the State 
of Utah had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Mr. Fox since 
the officer who allegedly had reasonable suspicion was not 
present at the Motion to Suppress hearing or the trial and was 
therefore never called as a witness by the State of Utah. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's factual findings for a motion to suppress 
should not be upset on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State of 
Utah v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1990). Factual 
findings are not clearly erroneous unless they "are against the 
clear weight of evidence, or [unless] the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made." Id. The trial court's legal conclusions 
underlying the motion to suppress are reviewed under a correction 
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of error standard- State of Utah v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 
(Utah App. 1991) . 
RULES & STATUTES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial 
on the grounds that Officer Schow (SLCPD) lacked "reasonable 
suspicion" to stop the defendant. Defendant's motion to suppress 
was argued and an evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 23, 
1995 before Judge Cornaby in the Third Circuit Court, Murray 
Department. (The motion hearing will hereafter be referred to as 
Motion.) 
Testimony on the motion to suppress issue was heard from 
defendant, George Cassity and Sherri Lee Blackburn. Officer 
McMorris, the Utah Highway Patrol officer, was present at the May 
23, 1995 evidentiary hearing but did not testify since the 
inquiry was limited to establishing that officer Schow, the Salt 
Lake City officer, had "reasonable suspicion" to stop the 
defendant. Noticeably absent from the hearing was officer Schow. 
As a result, no testimony was received from officer Schow as to 
the reason he stopped defendant or as to any driving pattern that 
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may have been observed by officer Schow. Defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence was denied by Judge Cornaby. 
Defendant was later convicted of a DUI after a bench trial 
before Judge Burton on September 12, 1995 in the Third Circuit 
Court, Murray Department. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 7, 1995, George Cassity followed defendant 
from a restaurant downtown to approximately 3900 South and Main 
Street when Mr, Cassity saw two Salt Lake City Police vehicles 
parked near the intersection. Motion, 21-22. 
2. Mr. Cassity stopped and gave the Salt Lake City 
officers certain information regarding Mr. Fox's driving pattern 
and when asked for his name and address he gave the officers a 
false name and address. Motion, 23. 
3. Sherri Lee Blackburn was a passenger in defendant's 
vehicle and testified as to the events leading up to the stop and 
that defendant's driving patterns were not unusual. Motion, 42-
43. 
4. On January 7, 1995 at approximately 12:00 a.m., 
defendant was travelling westbound on 4500 South at approximately 
350 West in Salt Lake County. Motion, 53-54, 59. Defendant was 
in his vehicle at a traffic light waiting to turn left when 
Officer Schow, a Salt Lake City Police officer, pulled up behind 
defendant. Over his loud speaker Officer Schow directed 
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defendant to pull through the red light and off to the side of 
the road. Motion, 53-54. 
5. Defendant was subsequently given field sobriety tests 
and an intoxilyzer test by Utah Highway Patrol Officer McMorris 
who arrived at the scene at approximately 1:30 a.m. Motion, 34-
36. According to Officer McMorris, defendant failed the field 
sobriety tests. Defendant was then given an intoxilyzer test in 
which he was required to blow into the intoxilyzer mouthpiece 
multiple times. After blowing into the mouthpiece a third time 
defendant registered a .08 blood alcohol level. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Salt Lake City Police Officer who pulled the defendant 
over failed to articulate his reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant had committed or was committing a crime or that the 
defendant was stopped incident to a traffic offense. In fact, 
the officer was not even present at the motion to suppress 
hearing or the trial. Therefore, defendant's conviction must be 
reversed and this case remanded to the trial court with 
directions to grant defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
BEFORE A POLICE OFFICER MAY STOP AND DETAIN A CITIZEN, 
HE MUST FIRST HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THAT 
THE CITIZEN HAS COMMITTED OR IS IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING 
A CRIME. 
The starting point in examining police conduct in the search 
and seizure area lies in state statutes. See Generally, State v. 
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Black, 721 P.2d 842 (Oregon App. 1986). Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
established basic search and seizure ground rules: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
The level of suspicion contemplated in § 77-7-15 "must be 
based on objective facts suggesting that the individual may be 
involved in criminal activity." State of Utah v. Menke, 787 P.2d 
537, 541 (Utah App. 1990).1 
Section 77-7-15 is most often interpreted in conjunction 
with federal and state constitutional analysis. Menke, 787 p.2d 
at 540-41 (discussing Fourth Amendment in conjunction with § 77-
7-15). Utah appellate courts have determined that § 77-7-15 
codifies the Fourth Amendment "reasonable suspicion" requirement 
first spelled out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See 
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. It requires a police officer, before 
making such a level II stop "to point to specific and articulable 
1
 In State of Utah v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized three levels of police-citizen 
encounters: (1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against 
his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; and (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
A traffic stop is a level II encounter. State of Utah v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988). 
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facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Menke, 787 P.2d at 
541 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21). An arresting 
officer must be able to articulate why particular facts lead to 
an inference of criminal activity. If the officer fails to 
articulate specific facts, his suspicion is classified as a mere 
hunch which is not a legitimate basis for such a level II stop. 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
In the instant cast, the officer who made the level II stop 
did not appear or testify at defendant's motion to suppress 
hearing. Therefore, it was impossible for the State to meet its 
burden of demonstrating "reasonable suspicion" for stopping 
defendant. 
It is well established that a police officer's stop of an 
automobile is a "seizure" and therefore subject to Fourth 
Amendment Protections. State of Utah v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 
(Utah App. 1992). Consequently, a stop can be justified only 
upon a showing of "reasonable suspicion" that an individual had 
committed or was committing a crime or was stopped incident to a 
traffic offense. Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 
(Utah App. 1989). 
In Roth, the Court of Appeals of Utah cited several cases 
involving reasonable suspicion. One such case was State v. 
Black, 721 P.2d 842 (Oregon App. 1986). In Black, the court 
ruled that an anonymous tip could not be the basis for a stop 
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where there was no indicia of reliability and the officer's 
observation did not corroborate the tip. 
The facts in Black are similar to the facts in the instant 
case. In Black/ a woman telephoned the police department and 
stated that a brown Ford Escort was speeding and weaving and 
identified its approximate location. This information was 
immediately radioed to a state trooper in the area. Within 
minutes the trooper observed a car matching the description, but 
did not observe any erratic driving. The trooper stopped the car 
and subsequently arrested the driver for DUI. 
In applying a Fourth Amendment "reasonable suspicion" 
analysis, the court in Black set forth the following indicia of 
reliability of an informant's tip: 
(1) the informant was known to the officer and had supplied 
information to him in the past; 
(2) the informant came forth personally and gave 
information that was immediately verifiable at the 
scent; and 
(3) the informant subjected himself to the possibility of 
an arrest for making a false report if the officer's 
investigation was fruitless. 
The court recognized that there must be some indicia of 
reliability of an informant's tip in order to justify police in 
acting on it by making a stop. In applying this analysis to the 
facts of that case, the court found that the informant's tip 
therein had no indicia of reliability. The caller gave 
insufficient information to identify herself and the trooper's 
personal observations did not corroborate the tip. The court 
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stated that the fact that the informant had accurately described 
the defendant's car was not a sufficient indication of 
reliability. Black, 721 P.2d at 846. 
In the instant case, defendant was stopped in unincorporated 
Salt Lake County by a Salt Lake City officer approximately three 
miles outside Salt Lake City limits. No evidence was presented 
to the trial court as to the basis for the stop since Officer 
Schow, the Salt Lake Police officer, did not appear at the 
evidentiary hearing. The trial court relied on testimony from an 
informant who admittedly disliked the defendant and who gave the 
Salt Lake City officers false information regarding his name and 
address. Following the analysis in Black, the trial court should 
have determined that the informant's tip lacked indicia of 
reliability and that no officer personally observed any driving 
pattern that would indicate possible intoxication. 
CONCLUSION 
A police officer making a level II stop must articulate his 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was 
committing a crime or that the defendant was stopped incident to 
a traffic offense. In this case, the officer did not articulate 
such reasonable suspicion, in fact the officer did not articulate 
any facts since he was not present at the evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Consequently, 
defendant's conviction must be reversed and this case remanded to 
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the trial court with directions to grant defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence, 
DATED this -> day of July, 1996. 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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